Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations, RN style
By Iain Ballantyne

As the Royal Navy's Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations (MCJO) concept receives its baptism of fire in the campaign against global terrorism, Iain Ballantyne explains how it works. Iain was able to witness MCJO first hand during the Anglo-Omani Exercise Saif Sareea (Swift Sword) and was in Arabia when the US Navy and Royal Navy unleashed their first bombardments of targets in Afghanistan.

Few, if any, Gulf region allies have felt able to allow British and American aircraft to participate in direct military action against Afghanistan by flying from their soil. With no substantial facilities on land in the Gulf, for either aircraft or ground troops to launch attacks from, maritime power was the only option in the opening phase of the campaign. By a strange coincidence, the largest deployment of British naval power since the Falklands War was already headed for the Arabian Sea off Oman before the September 11 attack on New York and Washington DC. The main aim of such a large British naval deployment was to prove that MCJO could work in a demanding operational environment - that is, somewhere that British forces might well have to go to war for real. Of course when planning for the deployment started in 1997, no one could have imagined kamikaze airliner attacks sparking a major war several hundred kilometres north of Oman. As it was Saif Sareea took place without any disruption. The Royal Navy's 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and the British Army's 4th Armoured Brigade conducted desert war games alongside Omani troops and tanks while British jets and aircraft from the host country flew support missions.
The most significant aspect of the exercise was of course the deployment of around 30 British warships to waters off Oman. This enabled the UK to switch from mock combat to the real thing fairly easily.
Two submarines originally scheduled to participate in Saif Sareea - the attack boats HMS TRAFALGAR and HMS SUPERB - were diverted to active operations. Trafalgar joined sister vessel HMS TRIUMPH in unleashing Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) at targets in Afghanistan during the first wave of Anglo-US strikes on October 7. Six days later both submarines fired more cruise missiles at a rapidly diminishing list of suitable targets.
On October 26, 2001, the UK Government confirmed that a substantial portion of the naval task force sent to the Arabian Sea would be staying behind after the conclusion of Saif Sareea in mid-November. The full details of the British force being made available for action in Afghanistan were given by Armed Forces Minister Adam Ingram in a House of Commons statement. He explained that 200 Royal Marines from 40 Commando would be based on the assault ship HMS FEARLESS. Mr Ingram said that the carrier HMS ILLUSTRIOUS would also stay. She would land her Harrier jets to take aboard Commando Helicopter Force helicopters and RAF Chinooks suitable for flying missions into Afghanistan. One of the TLAM-armed submarines would remain in the region, ready to fire again if need be. Also in the naval force would be the destroyer HMS Southampton and frigate HMS CORNWALL, together with seven Royal Fleet Auxiliary support ships. Mr Ingram described the 40 Commando marines as "the lead elements of an immediately available force to help support operations." He went on: "The remainder of 40 Commando - in the region of 400 men - will return to the United Kingdom, but will be held at a high readiness to return to the Theatre should our operational needs make that necessary. This arrangement will also permit us to rotate companies aboard ship and so guarantee the whole Commando remains fresh and fully prepared for operations." The total UK contribution was in excess of 4,000 men and women, including the crews of naval vessels and those flying and supporting RAF aircraft in theatre. Mr Ingram did not mention the Special Forces contribution, as it is not UK Government policy to comment on their operations. However, the Armed Forces Minister did tell MPs: "The House will recognise that the deployment of our Armed Forces is a grave step. We do it in the confident knowledge that by doing so we can depend upon them to make a difference. Our Armed Forces are special and we are deservedly proud of them. We ask a lot from them and they will not let us down."
Before the Cold War ended a decade ago the primary focus of British naval forces was countering the threat posed by Soviet submarines. The chilly waters of the Atlantic contained the key patrol zones and the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap was the funnel through which the Russian submarines had to flow.
To find, fix and (should the Cold War turn hot) kill Soviet submarines, the Royal Navy was centred on Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) task groups led by Invincible class aircraft carriers. The frigates of the fleet were tasked with finding the Russian threat using sophisticated sensors to snoop on communications traffic and powerful sonars to pinpoint submarines in the depths. Helicopters carried by both the frigates and the carriers then fixed the enemy and, if the dreaded day ever came, killed them with their torpedoes and depth charges. Air defence, to ensure roving Russian maritime attack aircraft could not get close enough to fire sea-skimming missiles at the ASW task groups, was provided by Type 42 air defence destroyers and small numbers of Sea Harrier fighters based on the carriers.
Operating solo beyond the task groups were the nuclear-powered attack submarines - the hunter-killers - pursuing a hidden war that is to this day still cloaked in secrecy. Far from hitting land targets as they do today, the attack boats concentrated on remaining unseen and unheard. They tracked Russian submarines and surface ships, ready to destroy them, if necessary, before disappearing into the blackness again. No one in the Royal Navy's surface task groups knew where their own boats were, the submarine community being an operational law unto itself.
During the Cold War, the Royal Navy's sea soldiers - the Royal Marines - were charged with securing NATO's frozen northern flank, spending their winters learning to live and fight in the wastelands of Arctic Norway. The Royal Navy's life was therefore fixed; its horizons reduced to the north Atlantic and Norway.
Meanwhile the Army and the Royal Air Force concentrated on countering the main threat posed by the Russians and their allies - massive Warsaw Pact armoured forces concentrated in central Europe.
The invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina in the spring of 1982 had provided a diversion into an expeditionary warfare. It gave the Royal Marines a chance to spearhead a real land battle and, with the sinking of the BELGRANO, had proved British submarines were as lethal as ever. The attrition rate among British surface ships was a severe as WW II, so it was just as well the conflict lasted only a few months. The Falklands War was a brief diversion that was soon forgotten and the Royal Navy returned to its standoff with the Russians. The UK's navy took some consolation from the victory over Argentina, in that it proved British sea power could still have global reach. But, it was the hammers of desperate East Berliners that changed everything.
Within a few years of the Berlin wall being knocked down, the Warsaw Pact had gone and the Russian Navy's submarines and warships were almost all confined to port, rotting at their moorings through lack of money to properly maintain them or send them to sea. Suddenly the Royal Navy's main mission looked rather forlorn, with the RAF and Army similarly bereft of an opponent to justify their existence. Then, in August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.
Some believed the subsequent victory in the Gulf, that saw Saddam's troops booted out of Kuwait by an American-led coalition, heralded the establishment of a New World Order. In reality it was the uncorking of the bottle, letting an evil genie loose to spread a New World Disorder. Far-sighted senior officers in the Royal Navy recognised that the key to defence of the United Kingdom, her best interests worldwide and those of the international community, had to be sea power and a new strategic concept was needed. How had the Gulf War demonstrated that? Firstly, the arena of conflict was far from home shores, in a region where, since Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez in the 1960s, there was no established UK military presence. The only way to transfer massive armoured forces from Germany to Arabia was by sea and they also had to be sustained by maritime supply lines stretching 4,000 miles back to Europe.
During the conflict, the Royal Navy played a significant part in destroying the small Iraqi Navy, cleared coastal minefields under fire and saved an American battleship by shooting down an enemy anti-ship missile. But, the British fleet could only watch in wonder as the United States Navy unleashed its huge firepower. Submarines and surface warships fired swarms of cruise missiles and strike jets were launched from massive aircraft carriers. Similarly, American amphibious warfare vessels poised off Kuwait - assault carriers and landing ships carrying thousands of US Marines - also impressed the Royal Navy. A major reason Saddam's forces in Kuwait were caught napping by the Allied ground offensive from Saudi Arabia was his generals watching the sea, anxiously waiting for a massive D-Day-style invasion by US Marines. It never came, but the mere threat of it contributed greatly to Allied victory.
Within a few years of Operation Desert Storm liberating Kuwait, the Royal Navy had acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles for its submarines. That acquisition was the key stone in the foundations for MCJO. By the end of the 1990s, the British had begun a massive regeneration of their amphibious warfare capability by bringing a new helicopter carrier into service and ordering construction of a whole range of landing ships. The Royal Marines found their unit firepower increased, their mobility broadened and they got back in the business of living and operating from ships belonging to a new combat formation called the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The scale of winter deployments to Norway was scaled back and Royal Marines were now more likely to go ashore in the jungles of West Africa and deserts of the Middle East than into the Arctic wasteland of NATO's northern flank. The Strategic Defence Review of 1998 confirmed the major revolution in British naval affairs. The UK's defence strategy was now maritime-based and SDR stated that, by 2015, the Royal Navy should have two new 50,000 tonnes super-carriers capable of carrying up to 50 aircraft (most of them Joint Strike Fighters). Crucially, SDR clearly stated that all three armed forces would make use of the Royal Navy's platforms (its ships) for operations around the globe. Post-SDR, RAF heavy-lift Chinooks have become a familiar sight on the flight decks of Royal Navy (RN) carriers and one day the Army's Apache gunship will also fly from the same ships. But, one of the most radical changes brought about by SDR has been the merging of the RAF's and RN's Harrier jets. The new Joint Force Harrier operates RAF Harrier GR7 strike jets alongside Fleet Air Arm Sea Harrier FA2 fighters on a regular basis. The GR7s are highly capable ground-attack aircraft proved in action during the Kosovo campaign, while the FA2s have been equipped with new radar and new air-to-air missiles that make them formidable fighters. To accommodate the new joint air groups, the three Invincible Class carriers - INVINCIBLE, ILLUSTRIOUS and ARK ROYAL - have been rebuilt. ARK ROYAL is the latest to undergo the conversion and is just re-entering service with the front line fleet. She will carry the first operational Merlin squadron. The carrier rebuilds have included nearly 200 tonnes of new steel being put into the ships along with revamped command and control facilities and improved accommodation for the crews. The most important change has been the removal of the carriers' Sea Dart air-defence systems to make room for dedicated munitions spaces and engineering stores for embarked RAF Harriers. This has also enabled an expansion in the flight-deck area to better accommodate up to 16 GR7s and FA2s. The number of Anti-Submarine Warfare helicopters embarked on the carriers has been reduced, although those carried by Royal Fleet Auxiliary support ships in any task group have been boosted.
Much of the thinking behind MCJO is merely a reflection of some simple truths about the world in the 21st Century.
Most operations will inevitably be conducted within striking distance of naval-led joint forces, as most of the world's population, the majority of its capital cities, and nearly all major centres of international trade and military power, are found within 100 miles of the sea. Trade routes and sites of natural resources converge in the most intense areas of human activity in the coastal regions, which are otherwise known as the littorals. The UK Government document outlining SDR stated: "In future, littoral operations and force projection, for which maritime forces are well suited, will be our primary focus."
Attempts by the UK Treasury to cancel, or scale down Exercise Saif Sareea, to save money were strongly resisted by the Royal Navy's senior officers. Oman also let it be known that calling the exercise off would be considered a mortal insult. As a demonstration of power projection 8,000 miles from home, Saif Sareea was MCJO's graduation ceremony.
Aside from nearly 30 naval vessels being the biggest RN deployment since the Falklands War, the UK's commando brigade had not deployed in such strength in the Gulf region since 1991. In 2001 brigade was based at Camp Fairburn, about 70 miles inland from the Gulf of Oman and conditions in the desert were harsh, to say the least. Temperatures during the day frequently peaked at 50 degrees centigrade. Seven litres of water was needed per man each day to ensure full fighting efficiency and the commandos were also surviving on rations. A 6am breakfast could consist of a bar of chocolate - early morning was the only time when it was solid enough to eat - oatmeal biscuits, plus a healthy helping of boil-in-the-bag burgers and beans or meatballs and pasta. Between midday and 3pm, the work rate slowed down even for super fit Royal Marines and they generally took a siesta. Heat exhaustion and sunstroke was the main enemy no matter what time of day or night, as temperatures after sunset rarely dipped below 30 degrees. The brigade's commanding officer, Brigadier Roger Lane, observed that it was all worthwhile: "You have to do this for real - you cannot use a simulator." In the early stages of the exercise the Brigadier was hedging his bets about whether or not his troops might be diverted to action in Afghanistan. When asked about the chances of them going he said: "The exercise will proceed, and conclude, as planned." Brigadier Lane did agree that the Royal Marines have experienced their fair share of terrorism - Northern Ireland in particular - but that the attacks on America were beyond anyone's experience. "We have been in the counter-terrorism game for many year and have seen some horrific incidents," said Brigadier Lane. "But, of course, none of us has ever seen anything of the scale and audacity of the attack that was inflicted on the USA."

In a further display of Jointness, a RAF CH-47 Chinook heavy lift helicopter lifts off the deck of HMS OCEAN with a Type 22 batch 3 frigate in the distance. RAF and Army helicopters and personnel regularly deploy to the carrier HMS OCEAN. (Iain Ballantyne)

The brigade's Commando Helicopter Force (CHF) was deployed ashore to Camp Fairburn's airstrip, which had been specially created for the exercise by Army engineers. It was predominantly occupied by the Sea King MK4s of 845 and 846 Naval Air Squadron (NAS) and the Gazelle AH1s and Lynx AH7s of 847 NAS. The CHF aircraft arrived in the Middle East aboard HMS OCEAN, which was also home to two RAF Chinooks that were frequent visitors to the airstrip. The extreme operating conditions really took their toll on the helicopters, with an average of 15 hours of maintenance needed for each hour of flying. The dust of the Omani desert got everywhere - attracted to oil-covered parts like glue - and the rotor blades of the helicopters had their edges covered in special tape to reduce wear and tear.
At sea HMS ILLUSTRIOUS operated her full air group of ASW and AEW Sea Kings, Sea Harrier FA2 fighters and RAF Harrier GR7 strike jets. The carrier's Air Engineering Officer (AEO), Commander Tim Davies said of conditions: "Since deploying for the exercise in early September we have been conducting intensive air operations. Preparation for flying usually starts at 7.30am and everything finishes somewhere between 9.30pm and 10.00pm. It is pretty demanding, especially as the Sea Harrier was conceived for operations in the more temperate European climate."
The commander of British naval forces involved in Saif Sareea was Rear Admiral James Burnell-Nugent, a veteran of two tense deployments to the Gulf in the late 1990s as captain of the carrier HMS INVINCIBLE. "Yes, this deployment is a superb showcase for MCJO," he agreed, when interviewed aboard HMS ILLUSTRIOUS. "Navies have a crucial contribution to make in shaping events on land. The Royal Navy no longer just roams the seas looking for fights with other navies. "Certainly in terms of deploying a task force 4,000 miles from home, with all the key strike elements of MCJO in place - airpower, amphibious warfare units and nuclear submarines - Saif Sareea has been a great success. "The attacks against America did make everyone in the task force sharpen up. But, the gathering of US Navy power in these waters has impinged on the exercise only with regard to American aircraft movements through the areas where we are operating with Omani forces."
Together with sister ship HMS INTREPID, now retired from service, HMS FEARLESS was crucial to British victory in the Falklands War 20 years ago - today she could be vital to success in the war against terrorism. The decision to use the 36-year-old assault ship as the launch platform for action against Afghanistan by British commando forces, gives the old lady an unexpected MCJO starring role in the twilight of her career. Only a year ago HMS FEARLESS suffered a severe engine room fire that could easily had destroyed her. But luck, together with swift and efficient damage control, saved her. Returning to Portsmouth Naval Base, she underwent major repairs and was returned to service not long before leaving for Saif Sareea. "It was really coming down to the wire to get her out here," said her commanding officer, Captain Tom Cunningham. "It involved a lot of hard work by the ship's crew and Fleet Support Limited who carried out the repairs."
FEARLESS is packed with modern command and control equipment, which is why she is the flagship of the UK's Amphibious Ready Group. She is due to run on in service until 2003 when the new state-of-the-art assault ship HMS ALBION will replace her. HMS OCEAN, the new helicopter carrier that is the ARG's other principal vessel, has returned to the UK for scheduled maintenance and may come back to relieve Fearless in the New Year. The 200 Royal Marines commandos that have been put aboard the assault ship as the spearhead of the UK's overt contribution to any raids into Afghanistan were due to be ready for action at the end of last month (November). Like other key Royal Navy commanders in the region for Saif Sareea, Commander Amphibious Task Group (COMATG), Commodore Jamie Miller, has found himself switching easily from pretend warfare to preparing for the real thing. "We always expect the unexpected," he said when interviewed aboard Fearless during the exercise. "UK armed forces are very highly trained and flexible. They are ready to do anything that is asked of them, from fighting to providing humanitarian aid." That flexibility, and the MCJO concept that frames it, are obviously now being put to the test as the US-led coalition heads into a potentially treacherous winter war in Afghanistan.