CONTENTS

RAN Platform Acquisition and Training Review by late Vice President Arch Waters
Future of Australia's Merchant Shipping Industry - Bill Bolitho, Ret'd Chairman ASA
Osborne House - North Geelong - proposal that it be a Victorian Campus of a National Naval Museum.
Osborne House 1919-1922 - First Submarine Base for "J" Class
Sale items
Should we have a Defence Committee of Management?
Proposal for lowering Defence retirement ages.
Royal Australian Naval Reserves (RANR) - loss of support by the RAN?
Royal Australian Naval Reserves (RANR) - Loss of traditional Awards.

NAVAL DEFENCE, Discussion Paper by Arch Waters (1998 Revised 2002)

BACKGROUND This paper is directed at the management and controllers of the military in Australia, in particular the Navy. It is fair to say that there is considerable disquiet about the Navy, its ships, its weapons and the future. There has been a very significant amount of money spent on weapons platforms, equipment and training of personnel and there appears very little to show for this except some ordinary ships, questionable submarines and good people leaving the Service. Australia is a small nation of 18.5 million people with a developed industrial base and a large continent to defend - we cannot afford these outlays without a significantly better result.

CURRENT POSITION We operated 3 elderly DDG's at significant cost due to age. We had 6 FFG's now out of date - budgeted to be brought up to the latest standards by 2004. We had destroyer escort now scrapped and we have completed all but wo of the Anzac class ships.
1. All the above ships are not capable of defending themselves against air and missile attack - yet the missile systems required have been available since the early Nineties. In fact our very best ships for anti-aircraft defence were the 3 elderly DDG'S. Why was this allowed to happen ?
2. FFG-'s: Of the 6 FFU s only 2 have a strengthened hull - the other 4 do not and are not suitable for work in heavy weather without the hull cracking. Why modernise them - the US Navy are scrapping all theirs by 2005. It is suggested we re-equip the latest 2 and sell the rest.
3. Anzacs (Meko 200): The design was purchased from Blom & Voss to replace the destroyer escorts. They are a much better ship by far, but time moves on and someone has moved the goal posts - the Anzac lacks space, but there is a provision to build to a larger hull. Why didn't we do so? Hopefully a new ship could be built as a Meko 123 (Brandenberg Class) design as a stand alone armoured warship. This modular design gives the ability to replace obsolete equipment quickly and cheaply and saves building new ships as systems change. The Anzac design (Meko 200) we constructed virtually retains only hull shape, little remains of the original internals. Why is this so? The original design had 2 turbines and speeds of 30 knots - a basic capability required to operate with our major ally, the US Navy. Apparently the single turbine decision was taken from the experience with the DE's when this power was seldom required. The experience with HMAS Anzac shows she is using her turbine over 50% of the time. Why didn't we build the later versions with 2 turbines and ensure the next hull is plated for the larger ship?
4. Kidd Class Destroyer: The rejection of this offer gives the appearance of an expensive mistake. The only valid criticism would be the age of the ships at the time of the decision (18 years) and the maintenance costs associated with that. The remarks regarding the purchase of these ships "may have given the wrong signal to our ship building industry" were incorrect. Tenix at that time would have welcomed the work to bring the 'Kidds' up to our requirements. They would have been the most capable warships in the Australian Navy by far and the most capable in our region. The Kidds were reported at that time to be in excellent shape.
5. Collins Class Submarines: The problems with these ships were well known. The US Navy has helped us sort out most of our problems. We now have the best diesel powered and quiet submarine in the world. It took about two years to fix the design problems and a considerable amount of money. Time has shown that, aside from gross waste of public money, we now have a great submarine.
6. Minehunters: They are coming along quite well but the reasons for high building costs must still be questioned.
7. HMAS Lift Ships ( Manoora & Kanimbla): These ships were rebuilt at great expense for a future service life of 15 years (to 2015). There must have been a better way to do this? The Navy inspection system was flawed as we bought rust bucket ships from the US Navy in very poor condition. This was one of the reasons used by Defence not to go along withc the Kidd sale. This should not have been allowed to happen - we cannot blame the US Navy. It is always a case of Caveat Emptor - let the buyer beware.
8. Incat Catamarans: What opportunities do these platforms give the Navy? They are very successful as high speed ferries all over the world averaging 42 knots. They can carry as many as 200 cars or a mix of trucks, cars and containers at high speed. They are relatively cheap to produce commercially, but would be more expensive as the Milspec systems, components and standards are applied. It is suggested the Navy lease one for six months. They can perform as patrol boats, larger troop carriers, helicopter carriers, Harrier carriers. One performed excellently in the East Timor situation. The really big question mark is can they handle really heavy seas ? The US Navy very interested and are trialling one - why has not the RAN persisted with this locally designed and constructed design?
9. Cray Boats: Australia has around 500 of these vessels in Western Australia. A huge resource waiting to be developed as part of our defence shield in time of conflict. These ships are around 20 metres long and are capable of 20-25 knots - some around 30 knots. It is suggested the Navy build 5 or 6 of these vessels and test weapons and systems. The cray boat fleet should be recruited in to the Royal Australian Naval Reserve with weapons and systems designed for each boat. The crews to undertake basic Naval training. The Israelis use similar size vessels armed with Gabriel missiles as well as other weapons. This may also remove the academic debates regarding the cost and usefulness of the blue water navy being replaced by smaller ships. Australia has plenty if they are ever required. What is important is that we should be examining this resource and doing something about it - but as usual inertia has set in!
10. HMAS Westralia & Australian National Shipping Line : The decision to rebuild this ship does not make sense. The British experience with rebuilding their RFA ships has proven to be very costly. The suggestion is that as this ship is fairly old we buy second hand and more suitable ship from trade. The facts are we need replenishment ships due to the patrol distances around the borders of our continent. We must do this as efficiently as possible. We do not require a ship of this size anyway. The real pity is that the Treasury mandarins demanded the sale of ANL. This company could have supplied ships to the RAN much as the RFA does to the RN.

DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

The contracts and purchasing policies of this Department leave a great deal to be desired, e.g. both Anzac frigates had been accepted under a cloud. The contracts were written without penalty clauses controlling the contractor. This was also the case for the submarines.
Costs were another factor. When the contractor has only one customer, i.e. the Government, and there are few commercial controls, costs tend to get out of hand. For example, with clever negotiation the New Zealand Navy was offered a third Anzac at a significant discount yet when Australia requested some minor alterations for crew accommodation, costs rocketed. Why is this so ?
Minehunters are a good example of exorbitant costs. Using the same hull a luxury yacht with expensive fittings, electronics etc., would cost one third to one half the minehunter. Why should this be so? A suggestion could be that this is the way the Government does business.
Several things must be clearly understood, the Navy is not getting the platforms they contracted for and they paid far too much. Their Purchasing Policies within the Defence Department are not professional. Anyone who has tried doing business with the Government and Military will tell you that. The Military claims that Industry is only interested in making money and that there is little trust between them. Both sides appear to use the lawyers too much. It is hard to compare costs, but the Turks built a Meko 200 with 2 turbines and a full weapons kit at reportedly US$50 million less than our Anzac ships.
The US Navy produce a complete Arleigh Burke Destroyer for US$850 million. Our Anzac reportedly costs US$375 million without her fill weapons kit! There must be a way of building ships at a lower cost to an agreed standard of building and equipment.
When the new privatised ADI comes on stream what happens then? Do we get another duopoly like Qantas and Ansett were before Ansett went under? The Defence Department is far too bureaucratic and not innovative. While there are some very able people in the Department, there appears to be no real direction. What can be done about this ?

NAVY MANAGEMENT

The electronic revolution has hit industry and is used to cut manpower and hence costs. However,Ihe Navy does not appear focus technology collectively and economically, resulting in manpower and cost reductions. The 14,000 + personnel employed within the Navy must be utilised a great deal better than they are at present. The US Navy has successfully reduced the crew size in USS Yorktown by 25% by the use of computerised systems. We should do likewise and say have a target of 95 crew compliment on an Anzac. In war this would be different and a larger crew would be carried. Crew size reduction could result in alleviating some of the current manning problems where the RANR are being used like a temporary staffing agency for the RAN instead of being truly a Reserve Force.
1. Officer Training ADFA has produced some excellent officers for all the services. However, all services tend to neglect this resource and so many leave after their commitment is completed. This is a HR problem and the Navy is particularly guilty in this respect. Most of these young officers are largely left to their own devices and not encouraged by the Service. The Navy does not use its HR Department properly - large companies have to because there is a cost if they do not. The Military and the RAN in particular, have no real idea how to go about this. The dearth of engineer officers in the Navy leads to the suggestion that the RAN should train all ADFA oflicers as engineers plus significant IT training to handle computerised weapon platforms - the world wide Merchant Service is doing this for their new shipping. This is the format used by the US Navy to train its officers - while it may not produce exactly the leaders we require in the early stages, it does get more technically trained people in the Navy. The Navy should train its officers to be able to manage the escalating technical environment.
2. Training Sailors This will be similar to the above with significant BR input. Engineering and IT training to TAFE certificate standard is vital The Navy will have less people to work with and more powerfhl computers - all personnel must be trained to industry standards. Training must be ongoing with the employment of TAFE's to train ships crews up to speed with the latest computers and software. This would be ongoing and could make Naval training much more attractive. Distance education may be required actually on the ships to keep sailors up to the latest technical changes, much as happens now in industry.
3. Term Employment It must be clearly recognised and acknowledged that the Military is not the Civil Service and can never be operated as such. Contracts should be offered to serving personnel from Admirals down to Junior Sailors. Only in this way can the service numbers be controlled. The use of females in the service, the cost of their training and the long term chances of them staying in the active side of the Navy is minimal. Contracts are the only way to control this. They must be given every opportunity to advance their careers, but marriage and children do not mix with the military. The opportunity should be given to them to have an active or non-active role. This is politically sensitive, but the cost of training and shipboard accommodation is expensive. However at this time some ships could not get to sea without a female compliment hence reducing crew sizes with replacement by electronics. Training for crews on a modem warship will be quite dififerent from what we have now, e.g. bridge watchkeeping could all be electronic. Officers and sailors will run and fight the ship using the computer systems aboard - much as a fighter pilot does with his aircraft. Engine rooms, damage control weapons and their systems can also be worked by computer. This will mean an immediate and urgent change in Naval training. It is not apparent that the Navy has been addressing these issues.
4. Navy Human Resources This Department needs some reworkng and must be more professional. Urgent input of competent civilian contract HR personnel should be involved to work this through. Discipline, of course, is vital in the Navy and this must be continued, but sensible personnel work could dovetail well. The object must be to retain good people in the Service and not ignore people issues that are so important.
5. Personnel Exchanges with Industry This is an area that is not explored. The Navy tends to be very insular and seldom gets involved outside its own community. This cannot be allowed to continue as, amongst other things, it does not expose the Navy personnel to the latest computer systems or management techniques required by industry to survive competition. Exchanges of personnel can be very useful - the Navy will not lose its people if they are on contract, but will gain from their exposure to different challenges. One of the major complaints industry has towards employing ex-service personnel is that they are not always innovative enough to handle the challenges of working in a competitive commercial industry environment. The above ideas and challenges will change all that conception.

CONCLUSION

Where to we go from here ?
1 . Examine carefully what new platforms are required, particularly for the economic zone south of Australia. There will certainly be long range fishing protection vessels required, and warships that go down there to protect Australian assets and support regional peacekeeping.
2. Re-negotiate all warship building contracts on a commercial basis and let the shipbuilders get on with it. The Navy should not appear until the end except for progressive thorough period inspections. If the ships are not built to specification, then payment will not be made. A success clause should be written into the contract to encourage the shipbuilder.
3. Have another look at the lack of Air protection arising from the "Kid" inertia.
4. Build Anzacs with 2 turbines, and don't pay any more.
5. Build the larger version Anzac as soon as practical. Maybe the ADI could price this and have it built in Newcastle.
6. Above all get the costs right-we have enough problems with the politicians - the one's in the Defence Department tend to be smarter. Many of the points mentioned are already being examined by the Service, but the Australian public is not told and nothing appears to happen. It is vital that support for the Navy is improved beyond a media public relations campaign.

PUBLICATIONS & ITEMS AVAILABLE

Victoria Division - Navy League of Australia:

2008-9 List (4 April 2008)

(Prices subject to change. Email for price confirmation.)

1. "Autobiographical Recollections of a Naval Reserve Officer" Limited Second Edition (100) by CMDR Stan Veale CMG VRD** RANR. Hard Cover 160pp, 81 illustrations colour and b&w, many from CMDR Veale's personal family files. A5 100gsm. ISBN 0-9580285-6-7. A unique story about a lifetime serving in the Navy from 1893 to 1987. Edited by CMDR John M Wilkins RFD* RANR. A story worth reading. $95 plus $15 p&h.

2. Royal Australian Naval College and Sir John Collins by CMDR John M Wilkins RFD* RANR. ISBN 0-9580285-5-9
The early days of the Victorian Colonial and Australian Navy and the foundation of the Royal Australian Naval College, Osborne House, North Geelong 1913-15 and Vice Admiral Sir John Collins RAN.
A limited signed Edition of 50 copies, 77pp A4 100gsm hard bound.
The monograph details the orginal historic mansion, Osborne House, its floor layouts and Navy use during the 1913-1915 period as the RAN trained its first Midshipmen Cadets.
The publication includes a resumé of the 1915 Jervis Bay, 1930 HMAS Cerberus Naval College sites, with a general overview of the career of one of the first Australian trained Midshipman Cadets to achieve promotion to Admiral - Sir John Collins.
$95 plus $15 P&H.

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Chapt 1. WW2 RANR - RANVR - RANR(S) awards and citations with some excerpts and photos to give an insight as to the personality of the person who received the award.
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348pp A4 100gsm and hard cover bound with gilt lettering. Appendices include State RANR Port Division Depots; COs DNOs etc, RANR Naval Intelligence, RANR WW2 Awards Summary, Australia's first RAN Inter-denominational Naval Memorial Chapel 1920 - 2002 at FND, History and legend of White Ensign, History of Naval Uniforms 1748-2001.
A comprehensive coverage in one volume. $275 + $25 P&H. within Australia.







5. Australian & British Naval Buttons, Buckles Banners & Badges 1748 - 2006
4th Edition (Limited - 100 copies) Sept 2007 by CMDR John M Wilkins RFD* RANR.
Copies numbered and signed by author. A History of British and Australian Naval Buttons together with a Collectors' Guide & Catalogue.
A5 114pp 100gsm wire bound.
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Over 600 colour illustrations plus a unique White Ensign history fold-out A4 chart.
Not available elsewhere.
This volume runs you through a Naval History précis for each of the Naval buttons issued 1748 to 2006.
A collectables reference you will not be disappointed in owning. Rarity ratings listed.
4th Edition Sep 2007.
ISBN 978-0-9580285-7-8.
$69.00 plus P&H $15.


6 . "Sea & Australia" 6 part video - a specially produced series by the Navy League to give a better idea of Australia and its maritime inheritance. On release it was gifted to every secondary school in the Commonwealth - NO STOCK AVAILABLE. $30

7. Navy League Crest - A high class laser image etched on 150 x 200mm solid timber with design outlined in matt gold. A nice state of the art production. Some delay may occur if out of stock. $40

8. Navy League lapel badge. $4 plus postage

9. Navy League tie . - Royal blue with Red or Gold Navy League crest repeated between diagonal bars of Gold & Red. $30 plus $5 P&H

10. Navy League dark blue peak cap with NLA logo - $20 inc P&H.

11. COOK CANNON Approx 1/10th. scale replica, A unique miniature 22ct Gilt silicon bronze HMB Endeavour cannon jettsined by Lieuteant James Cook 1770 on East Coast of Australia:
Price: Price on Application (International post extra). Limited numbered Edition of 100. A 16p A5 wire bound and numbered booklet on the history of the Cook cannon, loss, salvage and restoration 1770 - 1969, is included.

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