OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF NAVY LEAGUE OF AUSTRALIA
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Tomahawk for Collins?
By Dr Lee Willett

Australia's defence policy is based on maintaining effective continental defence while taking an active role in regional affairs and while seeking to participate more globally in multi-national operations in areas of primary strategic interest. Recent years have seen substantive re-evaluations of defence policy and maritime doctrine, sparking extensive debate about relevant force capabilities and mixes. Tomahawk for Collins could be one of those new capability mixes? Australia is a maritime power, and its strategic requirement to control the air and sea approaches predicates a defence capability built around maritime forces. Forces based at sea present governments with balanced and wide-ranging political choices. Playing an increasingly central role, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) contribution to joint and combined operations includes power projection and maritime strike capabilities.
Submarines and land-attack missiles are noted for their strategic reach. In the context of the findings of the 2000 defence White Paper Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, this paper will assess: the role of the Collins-class conventional submarines (SSKs) in Australian defence strategy; the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) interest in acquiring a long-range land attack capability for power projection; and whether a weapon such as the United States Navy's (USN) Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) is an appropriate and affordable option. It must be emphasized that, rather than just being desired, any such land-attack program must fill a specific capability gap in support of a clearly-defined strategic concept and purpose, and must be affordable.
Since the early 1990s, there has been much RAN interest in TLAM. The 1997 government strategic policy review (titled Australia's Strategic Policy), while noting that the Collins would provide a principal platform for maritime strike, concluded that a weapon with the very long range of TLAM was not required to support the enduring strategic emphasis: defence of the `inner arc' of the maritime and air approaches. Yet recent years have seen a re-generation of the Australian debate. In the wake of the East Timor crisis, arguments for Australia's development of a cruise missile capability which might be employed as a cost-effective deterrent or an enabling force in such contexts were primary motivations in the decision of the Department of Defence to re-assess the cruise missile issue. With the ADF busier than at any time since the Vietnam War, Defence 2000 de-lineated the next stage in Australia's evolving response to the continuing global strategic change and attempting to re-align Australian strategic aims with ADF force capabilities. Defence 2000 defined the ADF's main strategic tasks as defence of the homeland while contributing to the security of RIMPAC and other areas of primary strategic interest. From the RAN's perspective, the report highlighted the need to improve its force element combat power to make RAN forces more powerful, mobile and sustainable. Much of this debate has centred on the Collins.

The Collins-class SSK

The Collins' are an asset which can operate effectively (in both defensive and offensive postures) across the spectrum of military operations, deterring attacks on the homeland and areas of wider strategic interest, as well as giving Australia strategic reach and effectiveness disproportionate to its size. Australia's Strategic Policy noted that the strategic value inherent in a submarine capability supported an extension of Australia's own program. The Collins has been described as 'probably Australia's most important strategic asset for the decades starting 2000' with the 'potential to be an extremely potent strategic and tactical defence asset'.
There are strategic arguments against deploying a long-range strike capability aboard the Collins. Even with air independent propulsion supporting submerged operations for up to two weeks, a conventional submarine with only limited size, reach, speed, manoeuvrability and sustainability may be inappropriate for a weapon such as TLAM, the sub-surface-launch benefits of which are maximised by the forward-deployed, sustained presence of an SSN. Also, with limited numbers of submarines available, there is a debate about whether a submarine deployed for TLAM strike may be largely unavailable for other missions.
Defence 2000 states that the RAN must maintain the capability to defend its forces in Australia's extended maritime approaches. In an era of power projection, sea control and sea denial are vital to the ability to project force. Through stealth, flexibility and firepower, a submarine is the archetypal tool for power projection, sea denial and sea control. In addition to these core tasks, submarines provide: rapid deployment; readiness; reach; presence; poise; endurance; mobility; strategic and conventional deterrence; independence from host nation support; strategic, operational and tactical autonomy or integration with other forces; anti-surface and sub-surface warfare; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and indicators and warnings (INW). Adaptable to changing strategic circumstances, submarines give credibility to smaller navies. Conventional submarines remain popular with smaller navies, as they can have a disproportionate impact in the maritime domain. In the 1982 Falklands War, the rogue presence of the Argentine Navy's German-built 209-class SSK, SAN LUIS, caused considerable problems for the British Task Force as did, in 1999, the potential threat from the Yugoslav SSK, SAVA, for the coalition Task Force.
The well-documented problems experienced with the Collins class have, in some circles, underscored arguments that a submarine arm for a navy is an expensive one to maintain. However, this ignores the fact that submarines have relatively low through-costs and provide far more flexibility and firepower per dollar invested than many other platforms. Moreover, the technical problems associated with the Collins program have tended to overshadow the real issue - the ADF's understanding of the value of and requirement for a submarine capability.
Since the first of Australia's Oberon-class submarines arrived in 1967, parallel with developments in submarine technologies the role of submarines in Australian defence strategy has become far more extensive and complex as the ADF has sought to explore the submarine's prime capabilities - stealth, endurance, sensors and firepower. The ADF's raw strategic requirement for submarines - to operate at distance, well outside Australian waters and up to 2,500 nm from home base for up to 10 weeks, as a deterrent and data-gathering asset - remains largely unchanged. However, at a technological level, quite simply the Collins is a quantum capability leap from the O-Boats. More importantly, today submarines are required to make a much more wide-ranging and networked contribution to joint and combined operations. Captain John Dikkenberg RAN, formerly Commander of the Australian Submarine Squadron, wrote last year that the submarine `is a dichotomy of strengths and weaknesses, but on balance fulfils a unique niche in the defence spectrum' and provides vital complementary capabilities in a balanced force structure. As a result, the ADF submarine program has been fast-tracked under the defence capability plan of Defence 2000 so that, by the end of 2001, two Collins boats will be fully operational. Often regarded as the quietest submarine class in the world, with the class as a whole being upgraded with new technologies which were unavailable 10 years ago, the Collins-class will have a capability beyond its original specifications. Late last year, it was reported that the final two hulls of the class would be under threat unless more funding could be found to support the program. The purchase of the last two hulls is vital: so as to meet the strategic requirement of having two operational submarines available at any one time, six hulls are required to maintain the necessary two roulement cycles of three boats per cycle. It is evident, too, that the Collins' capabilities are performing well. Collins boats have excelled in several recent exercises, perhaps most notably HMAS WALLER in the US Navy's RIMPAC 2000 exercise. It has been reported that, to capitalise on the success of the Collins program, work on developing a new submarine class for the RAN will begin shortly after 2002.

TLAM

Defence 2000 states that the Australian Government views a strike capability as: an important element of Australia's military posture because it provides [Australia] with the flexibility to destroy hostile forces before they are launched towards Australia and when they may be most vulnerable … Strike forces can provide excellent support to Australian forces deployed abroad ... [Australian] capability would be focussed on an ability to attack those militarily significant targets that might be used to mount or support an attack on Australia.
These phrases suggest a requirement to attack land targets at distance. Today's strategic environment is dominated by precision munitions, principally those delivered by missiles. Improvements in anti-ballistic missile defences suggest that cruise missiles might be a cheaper, more practical and strategically more enduring option. In terms of a platform for a land-attack capability for the ADF, several options for a surface fit have been promoted. Yet the debate has focused largely on a submarine fit. In terms of the missile, the debate has focused largely on TLAM. Submarine-launched cruise missiles, especially one with the capabilities and reputation of TLAM, are a force capability - and, thus, political status - multiplier of significant magnitude for a medium navy. The key issue for Australian defence policy is distance, from defence of the `inner arc' to participation in multi-national operations on a global scale. Amongst the cruise missile family, TLAM's reach is unique. TLAM would bring to Australia a capability presently unmatched by any other regional power in the wider reagion. Submarines, with their stealthy flexibility and reach, maximise the strategic benefits brought by TLAM. TLAM-capable submarines bring the opportunity to project responsive, precise, deep-striking maritime force in-land at the place and time of choice across all levels of warfare with reduced risks both of collateral damage and to friendly forces and non-combatants, and all from a stand-off, covert and flexible platform. In the words of Chief of Navy Vice-Admiral David Shackleton, the ADF is `almost at the stage where it's gone beyond joint warfare to almost integrated warfare'. Fusing sea, air and land power into a joint maritime strike capability, TLAM is an important asset in terms of exploiting sea power's strategic function as a flexible enabling agent and would, for the RAN and the ADF, provide a more even distribution of offensive force capabilities. However, part of the challenge for Australia is defining a strategic niche which a land-attack capability must fulfil. This will largely dictate what missile, what payload and what platform is best suited to the ADF's strategic purpose. A key issue in this debate is the nature of Australia's relations both with the US and with other powers in the region. Defence 2000 notes that strike capabilities `offer a valuable option for contributing to regional coalitions'. While enjoying a strong relationship with the US, which the procurement of TLAM would endorse and augment at both political and military levels, the deployment of a weapons system with such offensive capability might send threatening signals to other regional players. It is, however, questionable as to whether the US would consider selling TLAM once again.
If employed correctly, TLAM can be a very effective diplomatic and war-fighting tool, meeting ADF requirements across the spectrum of military operations. It has proven utility as a coercive and war-fighting tool - if employed in appropriate political and military contexts. From Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 through to Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999, TLAM has performed as expected in military terms in each of the eight operations in which it has been used. The only questions that have been raised generally relate to the political and military sense in employing million-dollar, `war-winning' weapons to attack targets which, occasionally, may be inappropriate - for example, terrorist training centres, or radar sites that have been operational again within hours - and the political signals which have been communicated in using a stand-off weapon rather than a pilot or ground troops. On this latter point, in an era of casualty intolerance TLAM is perceived as a low cost, and politically clean, method of intervention. Yet occasional US use of TLAM against inappropriate targets has generated criticisms that: TLAM's coercive and deterrent value may have been eroded; and that random firings question the viability of employing limited precision bombardment to implement coercive diplomacy. If precision weapons such as TLAM are to be used for strategic coercion, they must be employed within the correct political and strategic framework.
If the strategic aim is to employ TLAM for purposes other than strategic coercion, then there is the issue of force levels. A relatively small inventory, particularly when aligned with that of the US, can provide a workable deterrent when employed in the right manner in the right strategic context. Yet Britain has discovered very quickly that an inventory of 65 missiles is rather limited when Britain's evolving concept of operations for weapons employment is indicating that the weapons system has greater tactical applicability than originally envisaged. If a larger number of rounds are required, the half-million US dollars that each new TLAM will cost might be better spent by a nation with a relatively small defence budget on a less expensive system, and/or supporting a purchase by sacrificing other capabilities and programmes. Australia is not unique in facing an imbalance between strategic aims and commitments, resources and programs. Moreover, the rapid increase in military capabilities of other regional powers means that the ADF's capabilities will decline in relative terms without consistent re-investment. Between 2008 and 2015, nearly all of the ADF's major systems will reach the end of their life expectancies. This presents a block obsolescence gap, but also an opportunity to fill it on a long-term basis. If Australia is looking to develop a cruise missile capability, this may mean a new missile - in the short term - and a new platform - in the longer term.
Cruise missiles can spread more evenly a defence force's aircraft burden, reducing the need for strike aircraft. TLAM has drawn comparisons between sea-based stand?off capabilities and the role of manned aircraft and between different types of stand?off weapons. Air-launched ordnance, with its greater repeatability and greater availability, is more effective in longer-term campaigns, as well as against hardened or mobile targets. Organic air power also provides greater flexibility in low to medium intensity operations. Yet, as has been seen in Operations DESERT STORM, DESERT FOX and ALLIED FORCE, the strategic requirement to degrade enemy air defences before the entry of the full follow-on force package mandates that a stand-off, unmanned weapon like TLAM can be used as a complementary, enabling agent for entry into theatre of other assets. This should not be viewed as an either/or debate. In the era of joint and combined operations, seapower and airpower are mutually supportive in securing the favourable air situation essential to implementing manoeuvre warfare.
The second question is one of missile capabilities. TLAM was conceived in the 1960s. Even the new US Tactical Tomahawk (TacTom) is contemporary technology only, and is probably only the beginning in the evolution of the next generation of TLAM capabilities. TacTom will build on the capabilities of the US and UK Block III, as well as bringing some new attributes. However, it might be in Australian interests to anticipate non-lethal cruise missile developments such as electro-magnetic pulse capabilities, or sub-munition dispenser variants such as the Kit2 versions employed to good effect by the US in DESERT STORM and ALLIED FORCE. Other significant cruise missile developments that should be of note to the ADF include weapons with greater ranges and speed.
The final question is that of a platform. A key question is where both a strike role and cruise missiles fit into Australian conceptions for a future offensive air system (FOAS). A decision to develop a land-attack cruise missile capability will fundamentally change the shape of the ADF. The political decision to enter into such a capability will be influenced to a great extent by technological developments which will influence the outcome of Western debates on the nature of FOAS. Moreover, casualty intolerance among political leaderships questions the long-term future of manned aircraft. This, and the cost of replacement of aircraft programs, suggests a longer-term pre-eminence for cruise missile technologies in FOAS issues.
The advantages of a composite package of TLAM and the Collins have been listed above. TLAM was initially considered as a replacement for the Royal Australian Air Force's F-111 strategic bomber. Defence 2000 stated that:
The Government has considered the future of [Australia's] strike capability after the F-111 leaves service, expected to be between 2015 and 2020. It is unlikely that there will be any comparable specialised strike aircraft suited to [Australian] needs available at that time. A range of alternatives may be available by then, including the much greater use of long-range missiles fired from transport aircraft, naval platforms, or even unmanned combat aerial vehicles.
If the ADF decides to pursue a cruise missile capability, an interim solution to plugging any capability gap - until long-term decisions on new platforms and the very nature of FOAS itself are made - could see the already-existing Collins submarines providing a maritime deterrent and strategic strike capability (from torpedo-tube launched TLAMs) complemented in joint force planning by upgraded F-111s carrying any one or a mix of a variety of currently-available stand-off air-launched cruise missiles. The ADF's FOAS research is centred around the Air 6000 project. Starting out with an evaluation of the capabilities of the two platforms which presently represent the ADF's air control and strike capabilities - the F/A-18 and the F-111, the project will examine the ADF's future mission requirements and (in what is a fundamental shift for any armed service) will look at what effects-based capabilities - as opposed to platforms - will be required to support those missions. Cruise missiles are a prominent option for FOAS, fitting the strategic strike aspect of any such future missions. Even if it is to be assumed that the realities of the technologies likely to emerge within the timespan for FOAS suggest that manned aircraft will remain integral in the capability framework of any future systems, weapons like TLAM may provide a key option here. For several years, both the US and the UK have been examining options for firing TLAMs from a variety of fast jet and transport aircraft, and in the Cold War, nuclear TLAMs were deployed on mobile ground-based launchers. The point here is that TLAM is a proven weapons system that can fit a variety of sea, air and land platforms.
Australia must have a clear strategic rationale for the employment of such weapons, as there is a danger in procuring TLAM for its reputation. A land attack cruise missile fit for the Collins provides a flexible, balanced and responsive maritime contribution to meeting Australia's strategic imperatives in high intensity combat operations. The Collins program is developing and, when equipped with the most capable weapons systems available, it can make a fundamental contribution to Australian security balanced against fiscal responsibility. If embarking a weapon such as TLAM, the Collins-class SSK would have the capability to support key Australian defence roles of defence of the inner arc and regional power projection in joint and combined operations.