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A personal view - David Hobbs Following the announcement that BAE Systems has been selected to lead the industrial team that will design and build two new aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy, David Hobbs, a former Royal Navy carrier pilot now a historian, writer, broadcaster and curator of the Fleet Air Arm Museum, takes an objective look the role aircraft carriers will play in the twenty first century and dispels some of the myths that have surrounded them. Great Britain invented the aircraft carrier because 70% of the earth's surface is covered by water. A fusion of ships and aircraft, therefore, offered the best way of deploying tactical aircraft where they were needed, when they were needed with sufficient immediate technical and logistical support to sustain them in action or whilst poised awaiting action. Nothing has changed. Aircraft operating from ships were conceived to extend a fleet's ability to fight a war at sea but they soon demonstrated their ability to spread their influence over 'asymmetric' targets on the land. It is no accident that the only British aircraft able to attack mainland Japan in World War II came from the decks of the RN's aircraft carriers. Their potential for projecting power has only recently been fully comprehended by British politicians and those 'air-minded' people who believed that air power was only viable when 'imprisoned' in a land locked base are now beginning to see the limitations of such an argument. In the 20th century, only Britain, the USA, Japan and, to a limited extent, France successfully designed and built aircraft carriers, equipped them with aircraft and used them in action. All built their first ships with British technical help. Other nations have imported ships, aircraft or training with great success and some, notably Germany, attempted to create a carrier force but failed. Definition The term 'aircraft carrier' accurately defines what such a vessel does; it does not describe the scale at which it is capable of doing it. It applies to both a 1944 'MAC-Ship'
capable of operating in the local defence of a convoy with three or four Swordfish aircraft and to the USS NIMITZ with its air group today. Such an imprecise name gives rise to misunderstanding since no two commentators are likely to have the same pre-conceived ideas about the vessel they are describing. It is easy to 'type-cast' carriers and to mentally 'pigeon-hole' them as strike, anti-submarine, helicopter, assault, replenishment or relief ships incapable of change. Nothing could be wider of the mark and pages could be filled with examples of ships that have moved easily between these roles or even carried out several concurrently. Few of the tasks carried out by aircraft carriers resembled those for which they had been intended. Their ability to carry them out is strength, not a weakness. Other warship types such as battleships and cruisers enjoyed periods of dominance but faded when evolving technology and their limited range of capabilities left them behind. Unlike them, aircraft carriers have absorbed new technologies and advanced from strength to strength. A carrier battle group has within it the ability to operate aircraft that can fight in roles across the spectrum of war fighting, deterrence and humanitarian relief. It can also sustain action with technical and logistic support. Asked in 1966 what the role of his command was, the Captain of HMS ARK ROYAL stated that it was to "travel enormous distances at high speed when ordered and to carry out any task on arrival in the operational area". A better definition would be hard to find. Legacy The equipment deployed by any armed force is the legacy of decisions taken by previous generations, often faced with very different circumstances. The present Invincible class, built to a mediocre specification as anti-submarine vessels in a Cold War context, are a good example of a bad design. It suffered from a lack of focus; failed to appreciate the immense value of size and constrained the ability of these ships to offer the intervention capability that British foreign policy has always relied upon. At the time of their construction, a number of medium sized navies looked for affordable carriers to replace their war-built ex British light fleet carriers. It is a damning indictment that none even short-listed the Invincible design, although Australia briefly agreed to buy the name ship at a "give-away" price in 1981 after a short-sighted defence review. Even here though, carrier flexibility worked and ships intended to replace the awful Tiger class Command/Helicopter/Cruisers proved much better ships that had the advantages of a carrier hull, albeit in small measure. This allowed the three ships to operate Sea Harrier STOVL fighters and even AEW (airborne Early Warning) helicopters in addition to anti-submarine helicopters. Recent improvements include the enlargement of the flight deck and bomb rooms after the removal of the Sea Dart SAGW (Surface to Air Guided Weapon) system which has allowed the embarkation of an enhanced air group including RAF GR-7 Harriers. A Joint Force of up to 16 Sea Harriers and GR-7 Harriers is regularly carried although 'tailored air groups' including anything from Chinook to Lynx helicopters can be deployed. The other 'legacy' with which the RN lives today is the loss of the CVA01 carrier project in 1966. The first ship was to have been named QUEEN ELIZABETH although this was not made public at the time. This would have kept alive the tradition that the first 'capital ship' laid down in a particular reign is named after the Sovereign. She would have been a national asset, capable of operating aircraft from all three services including joint strike fighters procured jointly for the RN and RAF and was to be fitted with a Joint National Command facility. Her cancellation, after 10 years work and when the design was ready for industrial tender, followed the notorious 1966 Defence Review. Part 1 of this stated: "Experience and study have shown that only one type of operation exists for which carriers and carrier-borne aircraft would be indispensable; that is the landing, or withdrawal of troops against sophisticated opposition outside the range of land-based air cover. It is only realistic to recognise that we, unaided by our allies, could not expect to undertake operations of this character in the 1970s - even if we could afford a larger carrier force". Quite apart from the fact that 'experience and study' showed no such thing, Part 2 of the same document said: "The aircraft carrier is the most important element of the fleet for offensive action against an enemy at sea or ashore and makes a large contribution to the defence of our seaborne forces. It can also play an important part in operations where local air superiority has to be gained and maintained and offensive support of ground forces is required". These two contradictory statements hardly reflect the considered reflections of a 'joined up' Government. Sixteen years later, "unaided by our allies", British forces were undertaking "operations of this character" in San Carlos Water liberating the Falkland Islands. The scenario might have been written to illustrate the fundamental importance of QUEEN ELIZABETH, indeed her existence might have acted as the deterrent that would have prevented the war, but it fell to two much less capable ships, HERMES and INVINCIBLE, to make the operation possible. Unfortunately, several generations of British naval officers have been brought up with the assumption, from this legacy, that carriers were somehow "not allowed" in Britain. After decades of being a "small-ship" navy with a few small carriers, it will not be easy for the 'ship handlers' to grow into the new carriers in 2012 and it is they, rather than the aircrew who will struggle to achieve the new ship's potential. Analysis of future requirements Defence Reviews in Britain in 1957, 1966 and 1981 failed to offer a viable structure for the armed forces or a realistic policy for them to implement. "Looking into the future" is not easy. A planner looking forward for the life of a major warship, say 30 years, in 1932 would have had to predict the rise to power of Hitler in Germany, appeasement, militarism in Japan, the end of US isolationism, the Second World War with Russia as an ally, the Cold War with Russia as an enemy, the Korean War, the decline of the British Empire and the Suez Crisis! On a tactical level, the demise of the battleship and the rapid development of aircraft, radar and guided missiles were significant. Similar prophesies in our own era made in 1980 might not have included the South Atlantic War, the end of the Cold War and the spread of regional conflicts requiring western intervention. They should have placed more emphasis on counter-terrorist operations however. Since 1945, British forces have been in action against "stateless" terror groups in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Borneo, the Former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone and others. If looking into the future is so difficult, what can we do to 'future proof' our forces? Experience of the recent past can be analysed in a process known as 'hindcasting' in the USA, and we can look for weapons systems that survived the period like those I have illustrated. Aircraft carriers not only survived the 20th century but also continued to grow in importance and capability. Battleships did not. Aircraft carriers, in a variety of forms and shapes, are important national assets. The very fact the future carriers, CVF, are seen today as the cornerstone of Britain's future defence posture 37 years after the 'death' of CVA01 illustrates that their importance has transcended the opposition of ill-informed politicians. Myths Several myths have been rebutted in the previous paragraphs. Others, sometimes mentioned by those unfamiliar with carrier operations, need to be laid to rest. · In the right place. Experiences abound where carriers have put tactical aircraft in the right place at the right time. The defence of Kuwait against Iraqi aggression in 1961 by VICTORIOUS, CENTAUR and BULWARK is just one of dozens of British examples. Those with a 'fortress mentality' have to realise that a carrier battle group does not need to be within sight all the time to be effective. · Vulnerability is the most common myth, usually associated with comments about eggs in baskets. Facts reveal a different picture with only eight British carriers lost in the Second World War, representing a smaller percentage of those deployed than any other warship type. Only two of these were part of a balanced task force with a full air group in action at the time of their loss. Two others were miss-employed ferrying RAF aircraft and one old ship had no aircraft on board but relied on the RAF for a fighter defence which proved ineffective against Japanese carrier-borne aircraft. Since 1945 no potential enemy has demonstrated the ability to locate a British carrier in action, let alone attack it. · Carriers need support and 'escorts'. So do land based expeditionary air forces, that is why the RAF maintains its own Regiment of specialist soldiers. It also needs transport aircraft, engineers to build facilities at temporary air bases, oil tankers and specialist ammunition carrying ships to carry bulk logistics. As is often the case, the USN has found a better use of the English language when they refer to ships in company as a 'Battle Group', implying mutual support by ships of disparate strengths rather than some weakness in the 'capital ship' that requires it to be 'escorted'. One last myth concerns deck landing. Once propellers, straight decks and crash barriers made deck landing a difficult and dangerous operation for the unpractised. The British inventions of the angled deck and mirror/projector sight changed all that and the RN has not felt the need to operate a training carrier since 1956. Techniques can be practised ashore and I made my first catapult launch and arrested landing off Puerto Rico having sailed from the UK over a week before in HMS ARK ROYAL. Several of my contemporaries joined carriers in the Far East before making their first 'trap'. The 'system' would have hardly allowed that to happen if there were to be a significant risk of failure. Besides that was over 30 years ago; in 10 years time equipment automated landings and equipment will be that much better. We are, after all, confidently expecting to operate unmanned aircraft from ships by then! The Future Carrier (CVF) The Royal Navy began to make tentative plans for new carriers after the South Atlantic War revealed flaws in its legacy equipment. At first, three ships of about 30,000 tons were considered but the growing importance of intervention operations led to deep studies as part of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998. In consequence plans have been taken forward for two much larger ships capable of operating tailored air groups made up from Joint Forces, including Joint Force Harrier and its successors. Studies by two industrial groups evaluated both CV designs, with catapults and arrester wires, and STOVL designs. In October 2002, the UK Government elected to take forward an "adaptable" design, based on the CV hull but fitted initially with a ski-jump for STOVL operations. At the same time, the STOVL version of the F 35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was chosen as the fast jet component of the air group. The CV version is a more capable aircraft but will not be available by 2012 when the UK needs the first ship to be at sea and operational. To cover against the possibility of its acquisition in future, the CVF is to be capable of "easy" adaptation to take catapults and arrester wires. Given the inability of the CV JSF to available in time, one wonders why so much time, effort and money was expended in less 'future proof' options when the adaptable carrier seems such a common sense approach. It may well be that the ships will operate both versions of the type, capitalising on their relative strengths. Unlike earlier types, the JSF has sufficient commonality between sub-types to make this a viable proposition. On schedule in January 2003, the UK Government announced that design work would be taken forward by an industrial group led by BAE Systems with Thales as a partner. They will now work on a detailed design before the next milestone, which will be a contract to construct two ships, expected in 2004. The first metal is expected to be cut in 2005, after which the first ship is to be launched in 2009 for completion and commencement of a trials programme in 2011. The first ship is to be operational in 2012 and the second in 2015. INVINCIBLE and ILLUSTRIOUS are already over 20 years old and the second CVF is planned to replace ARK ROYAL in 2015, by which time she will be 30 years old. There is no room for slippage. In addition to the JSF, the Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (MASC) Project is of critical importance to the CVF's ability to operate autonomously. The decision to opt for a ski-jump is not necessarily fatal to the possibility of buying E-2C Hawkeys's from the USN since the type has demonstrated the ability to launch from a ski-jump built ashore at NAS Patuxent River during the 1980s. Whether it can do so regularly at sea will be an interesting question for the Project Group to study. Size does matter and the CVF design that is emerging reveals a ship of over 50,000 tons with about two thirds of the capability of NIMITZ for about one third of the cost. A balanced air group of about 50 aircraft is possible. This is an exciting prospect from British designers who could well be producing a ship that is both affordable and effective. Other navies cannot but take notice and the design is likely to be a long-standing one with export potential. The USN perspective With 11 strike carriers in service and another building together with 11 helicopter carriers also capable of operating STOVL Harriers; the USN is easily the world's largest carrier force. It has consistently built big ships 'future proofed' against changes in aircraft design and air group composition. Work is proceeding on evolution from the Nimitz design to CVNX; a new large hull designed to take advantage of the latest technology. Recent statements from the Pentagon have, however, shown that the Bush administration is convinced that carriers remain the essential core of the fleet's combat capability but are by no means convinced that big carriers are the way forward. The Nimitz design can be traced back to the aborted United States project of 1949 and as well as being expensive to build, they are extremely manpower intensive, and therefore costly, to operate. Only one shipyard is capable of building them. Cruise missiles, spy satellites and other new technologies have reduced the size of air groups and recent studies have focused on the possibility of procuring a larger number of smaller carriers with construction being shared between a larger number of shipyards. Present plans call for the USN to deploy more than 20 battle groups in the war against terrorism. Only half these can include carriers and the procurement of ships like the British CVF would make a lot of sense. Using the rough order of costing mentioned earlier, six CVF hulls could be purchased for the cost of two Nimitz giving the potential to embark 300 rather than 150 aircraft and be in more places at once. These numbers, or some like them are causing a lot of thought in the Pentagon at present. USN air groups would probably comprise a mix of F-35 JSF/ E-2C and EA-6B (or its replacement) types. The F35 is a very capable fighter, even in its STOVL form and overcomes many of the earlier limitations of STOVL aircraft. The USN may well procure this version as well as the CV variant to deploy in larger numbers on helicopter carriers for specific operations. Significant changes may be evident soon and we may see co-operation between the UK and USA on carrier design as close as that on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. A long look into the 21st century Aircraft Carriers need no host nation support, they can poise out of sight 'over the horizon' waiting for the political decision to act. They can operate 'tailored' air groups capable of operations at long ranges that make counter detection by any but the most sophisticated opposition unlikely. Should Government decide not to act, they can fade away quietly without embarrassment. Those who favour long range bombers as an alternative forget that carriers can persist in operation, can ferry and land troops with helicopters, counter submarine surface ship and air threats, provide humanitarian aid and support national diplomacy. 'Showing the Flag' is powerful adjunct to foreign policy as those who have seen a US carrier on a visit to their shores will agree. Aircraft carriers are a two-stage weapons system in which the ship gives range, poise and sustainability. The embarked force gives a whole spectrum of offensive and humanitarian capabilities 'from the sea' that are difficult for a potential enemy to counter and often impossible for land based air, a long way away, to replicate. They may change their size and shape as much over the next ninety years as they have over the past ninety but their future is secure. The use of carriers as sea-base platforms is set to expand and it will be interesting to see how Australia, emerging as one of the most significant medium powers will change her force structure. Once a member of the 'carrier club', she paid off MELBOURNE with her Skyhawks, Trackers and Sea Kings in 1982 without replacement. She has recently selected the JSF as a potential replacement for the F-111 and F/A-18. If she logically chooses the F-35C tailhook or carrier version, will it be shackled to a land base or will its true potential be realised as part of a joint force operating from a sea base? If she wanted to, could she afford it? France is in the market for a second carrier and may well lean to the CVF design, especially with Thales taking a place in the project management. Brazil and India have old carriers and want to replace them. The JSF must be the only logical choice for the manned element of the British Future Offensive Aircraft System (FOAS), another key element of the SDR. How very sensible to procure the carrier version with its longer range and to operate it, when necessary, from the CVF. I cannot see why anyone would not want to! Obsolete gun-armed cruisers left over from WW II, they were modified at 25% the cost of the cancelled CVA01 to carry four Sea King helicopters, which could be operated one at a time from a cramped flight deck aft of a box-like hangar. They were probably the worst warships operated by the RN in the modern era and represent a design of which the Service should be ashamed. Why the carrier CENTAUR, which was in reserve at the time, or the incomplete LEVIATHAN were not commissioned as helicopter carriers is beyond comprehension. Both could have operated up to 20 Sea Kings. |
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