Articles from Previous Issues of 'The Navy' April - June 2002

The RAN and Air Warfare Destroyers
by RADM Andrew Robertson, AO, DSC, RAN (Rtd),

NAVY LEAGUE's Cadet ANNUAL EFFICIENCY TROPHY AWARD 2002

The RAN and Air Warfare Destroyers
by
RADM Andrew Robertson, AO, DSC, RAN (Rtd),
Federal Vice-President Navy League of Australia
and
Mr John Jeremy
Past President RINA (AUST Div) - past CEO Cockatoo Dockyard.

Following on the demise of the Carrier force in the early 1980s, the further major reduction in the offensive and defensive capability of the RAN last year with the withdrawal from service of the three aged but still next most powerful units - the Guided Missile Destroyers (DDGs) - leaves the Navy seriously unbalanced and in need of urgent enhancement.

HMAS HOBART at the entrance to Sydney Harbour on a particularly rough day. HOBART and her sisters PERTH and BRISBANE have now all retired from RAN service. This is the first time since 1911 that the RAN has been without a destroyer class. (RAN)

A close look at the state of the RAN, including its severe manpower problem, seems to be of national importance. True, indeed, the Government has indicated in its White Paper, Defence 2000, its future intention to replace the capability represented by these old ships by the construction of at least three Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs).
However on current announced plans the first of these would not commission for about 12 or more years. Much can happen in this time and the question must be asked whether the nation should take the risk in the meantime with a severely run down navy.
We have seen in recent years the sudden eruptions, with little warning, of the Gulf War, East Timor and now the war in Afghanistan.
In all of these situations Australia has been involved, taking a leading part in the East Timor operations. The Navy has been in the forefront of Australian participation and has not always been equipped adequately for the tasks required, and there has always been the possibility of escalation to a more serious level of operations.
In the Gulf War we saw the unseemly and time-consuming scramble to fit several ships with some form of close-in defence against missiles even though this threat has been present at sea for many decades. Recently in the war in Afghanistan, possessing neither aircraft nor cruise missiles, our ships could not take part in the main allied offensive action and were - apart from political considerations, taking over some comparatively minor duties, and giving support to the very small army deployment -largely irrelevant.
The world strategic situation is changing quite rapidly and, as ever, it is not possible to see far into the future and certainly not as far as the time when, under current plans, we may see the AWD enter service. We are fortunate indeed that in the current Afghan crisis the major powers are aligned in their approach to terrorism, and we must hope that this general co-operation will continue.
However there are huge areas of uncertainty as the new global economic and strategic alignments unfold.
The Middle East and the India/Pakistan flashpoints remain. In the NW Pacific the world's super power - the US, the rising economic and military power - China, the slowly-recovering former super-power - Russia, and the world's second greatest economic power - Japan, face each other. And next to powerful South Korea in the geographic central area of this power vortex sits the unstable and unpredictable North Korea. Japan, despite its economic woes, is slowly taking a role in world affairs commensurate with its economic power and has put out feelers to gauge reaction to extended its reach with exercises in the South China Sea, a move which may not be entirely welcome in East Asia.
The tensions in this area including over sea boundaries, disputed islands, trade, spy ships, maritime and air incidents, claims in the South China Seas, and Taiwan, have been well managed for several decades, but who can predict with confidence what will happen in the future?
While we might hope to avoid involvement in any major eruption in the area, historically for varying reasons, this has not always been an option for our Governments.
So it would seem that a modem well-equipped and capable ADF is as much in Australia's interest as it has ever been. Given our geographic position a major element of our ability to defend ourselves or to contribute to an allied effort will be the capability of the Navy. Without the DDGs the RAN, while well-equipped for the movement and logistic support of modest ground forces, can no longer provide area air defence or a significant level of gunfire support for deployed ground forces, nor can it provide adequate Fleet defence.
While the six new Collins Class submarines are proving to be most effective in their roles, the surface fleet, so relevant in all situations, is now poorly armed. The new Anzac class Frigates and the older Adelaide class guided missile frigates (FFGs) (when they are updated in the next few years) will provide an effective small frigate/escort force but without any long range punch. The new mine-clearance vessels form a very effective core force for their role and the survey vessels are in good shape. Likewise the transport ships MANOORA, KANIMBLA and TOBRUK give Australia a useful force for the transport and logistic support of a modest overseas or coastal deployment.
However, one of the two fleet tankers and the entire patrol boat force require very early replacement. A most concerning aspect is that about 70% of all surface ships in the Australian Navy are either unarmed or fitted with ancient pre-WW2 designed Bofors guns without any fire control equipment. Given the very small number of well-equipped escort vessels and the huge diversity of tasks requiring their presence, in any serious war there would be little chance of providing escorts for many of these poorly armed vessels. They would be at serious risk facing almost any form of maritime attack. Painting them grey is hardly an effective defence, and there is a morale aspect for crews which must not be overlooked.
It would seem from the above that a major programme to increase the effectiveness and deterrent value of the RAN is of national importance. Part of such a programme must include the early provision of the projected AWDs.
What now, in layman's terms, are the broad likely requirements for an AWD in our environment in the early 21st Century?
We would suggest something along the following lines:
-A ship capable of operating effectively in all weather conditions from the tropics to the sub-Antarctic with a range of 6,000 nautical miles or more, a maximum speed of 30kts plus and the following characteristics /capabilities:
· Long-range area air defence with appropriate detection and control systems and missiles;
· Anti-submarine action with detection and delivery systems for appropriate weapons including torpedoes;
· Operating two helicopters equipped with air to surface missiles, torpedoes and ASW equipment together with equipment for reconnaissance and ship missile control;
· Long-range cruise-missile (such as Tomahawk) for strike against both land and ship targets
· Operating UAVs;
· At least one, preferably two medium gun systems capable of firing extended range ammunition against ship or land targets;
· A hull size and design allowing for major equipment additions and alterations during the life-time of the vessel, including at least one major modernisation;
· Robust design to ensure a reasonable chance of survival after receiving action damage and to reduce damage to vital areas, equipment and personnel;
· Self-defence against missile, torpedo and mine attack;
· Low ship signature against all detection systems both above and below water;
· Able to operate closely with US naval forces in all forms of warfare.
Clearly these requirements indicate a vessel of some size - maybe 7,000 tonnes or more. But this aspect should not be of concern, for hulls and propulsion machinery are relatively cheap. It is the equipment fitted which often governs the cost. Such a ship will of course be very flexible and capable of contributing effectively to deterrence, long-range maritime and land strike, army support and almost all types of maritime operations. Costly? Yes. But can wealthy Australia take the risk of having a badly unbalanced Defence Force as we become more and more responsible for our own defence. Surely it is a matter of Government budgetary priorities and the internal allocation of funds within the Defence organisation. What then are the options for the projected Air Warfare Destroyers?
In THE NAVY, April-June 2001, Dr Roger Thornhill examined the options available to the RAN for existing designs to meet the air warfare destroyer requirement. The ships he described included the German F-124, the Netherlands LCF, the French/Italian Horizon, the British Type 45, the Spanish F-100 and the Gibbs & Cox design for a frigate specifically adapted to Australian needs and based largely on the design philosophy and standards of the USS ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG-51) design. He concluded that none of these ships fully met the anticipated RAN requirements, but the Gibbs & Cox ship, the F-100 and the F-124 could be classed as favourites. Neither do any current designs fully meet the requirements we have set out above, particularly in regard to the second gun and range. Many factors will determine which ship is finally selected.
In addition to the operational requirements these factors include:
Technical risk - the recent RAN experience with the design and construction of the Collins class submarines, the most advanced class of conventionally powered submarines in the world, has demonstrated the impact of technical risk on programme and cost.
Setting out to achieve the best sometimes results in setbacks. The alternative, of never acquiring anything that has not yet been proven in service by others, would condemn the RAN to technology that is always less than state-of-the-art and possibly less than suitable for our needs.
Lead time - the design of modem combat ships is a complex and time-consuming task that, with few exceptions, is becoming more and more an international effort.
A decision to develop a unique ship for the RAN would demand more time than perhaps we have, not to mention the higher cost of this option. Modification of an existing design is a shorter route, although this process can be complex, time-consuming and expensive, depending on the extent of the changes required.
Logistic and training considerations - in his Keynote Address at the Pacific 2002 International Maritime Conference on 30 January, VADM David Shackleton, Chief of Navy, outlined the problems the RAN currently faces supporting and training personnel to operate the wide range of equipment used in the fleet today.
He expressed a preference for reducing the diversity of equipment to reduce the training costs and the problem of maintaining the support inventory this diversity demands.
Suitability for Australian Build - there is greater recognition today of the benefits that flow to the RAN and Australia as a whole by the local construction of our naval ships. Australian shipbuilders have proved that they are capable of meeting most challenges but the design licensing conditions imposed by others may influence the extent to which Australia can conveniently adapt and modify existing ship designs. Purchase cost - the acquisition cost naturally plays a large part in any acquisition decision, but the total cost of ownership through-life is a better measure of the relative merits of competing designs, provided naval requirements are met. Historically, the RAN comprised ships designed originally for the British Royal Navy, or designed to RN standards.
The decision in the early 1960s to buy the DDGs from the United States broke with this tradition. It was an inspired decision that provided Australia with some fine ships that served the RAN very well for decades, but resulted in a navy with two technical and operational cultures -RN and USN.
Gradually, the links with RN design philosophy have been broken, a process hastened by the sourcing of ship designs from a wide range of sources -US, Australian, Italian, French and Swedish.
Whilst this process has introduced some fine ships into RAN service, it has created the training and logistic nightmare to which VADM Shackleton referred at Pacific 2002. The preference expressed by the Chief of Navy for more standardisation of equipment in future RAN ships is understandable. There are risks inherent in such an approach applied too rigidly it can result in the RAN being denied the benefits of new technology that often have a significant impact on capability and the cost of ownership.
Certainly, a high degree of equipment standardisation would seem to be warranted in the new ships that will replace HMA Ships MANOORA, KANIMBLA, TOBRUK, WESTRALIA and SUCCESS.
In so far as the combat ships are concerned, it is perhaps more important to consider the design and operational philosophy behind the competing designs.
Today the two main classes of surface combat ship in the RAN are of US and German design origin. This would suggest that the potential short list of contenders identified last year by Dr Roger Thornhill is appropriate if some degree of standardisation of RAN ship design philosophy is to be achieved.
The Spanish F-100 may seem to be the odd ship in this list, but it is the product of an alliance between the Spanish shipbuilder Izar, and Lockheed Martin and Bath Iron Works of the United States, working together as the Advanced Frigate Consortium (AFCON). The ship has the Aegis combat system as fitted to the US DDG-51 class and a machinery and weapon fit with much in common with the present or near future RAN inventory.
There is an old expression used by those who have been involved in naval design and construction -"It takes ten years to get a ship". A review of past projects tends to confirm the truth of this saying, although with improving shipbuilding technology fewer of those years are taken up by actual construction, with more required for the selection, design and approval processes.
Today the RAN is a hard-worked, well-equipped, if unbalanced, navy but many of the ships are approaching their end of life. Replacements for the LPAs, TOBRUK and the replenishment ships will keep Defence and Australian shipbuilders busy over the next fifteen years. Whilst the replacement of the air-warfare capability lost with the passing of the DDGs is now urgent, the replacement of the six Adelaide class FFGs is not far behind. The FFG-07 class guided missile frigate was originally designed to be a relatively inexpensive ocean escort. It was not intended as a front-line warship, nor was it expected to have a life much beyond twenty years. Our oldest FFGs, ADELAIDE and CANBERRA, are now twenty-one years old.
All six ships are shortly to be modernised (between 2002 and 2006) to extend the life of the hull and to improve the combat system. This will significantly improve the capability of these useful ships. That it has proved possible to extend their life towards 35 years, and increase the upper displacement limit from 3,500 to 4,200 tons, says a lot for the quality of the original design.
This modernisation should allow the first four ships to remain in service until 2013 - 2017, with the newer two, the Australian-built MELBOURNE and NEWCASTLE, to last until 2017-2020. It is hard to predict the demands likely to be placed on the RAN in the next twenty years, but if it does 'take ten years to get a ship', then we need to be starting the process, that will deliver the FFG replacements, in the very near future.
If we are also to minimise the range of different equipment and designs in the RAN as preferred by the Chief of Navy then perhaps the FFG replacements should be of the same family as the AWDs. Not all ships would necessarily be equipped to the same standard, depending on the intended role. The time frame is close to that postulated for the AWD. While the desirability of building the air warfare destroyers in Australia is clear, in the current evolving strategic environment, accepting the time delay resulting from the decision-making process would seem to be taking a great risk in our national defence. Maybe the option of selecting an existing design which perhaps, with minor modifications, most nearly meets Australian requirements and obtaining the first ship or ships from a current overseas production line while building remaining ships in Australia would be the sensible way to go.
This approach has been taken in the past when, as now, political decisions on the replacement of needed capabilities have not been taken in a timely manner. At all events the selection of the next generation of surface combat ships for the RAN is one of the most important decisions facing Canberra, and must be taken in the very near future if the nation is to have a chance of maintaining an adequate level of sea defences over the coming decades.

NAVY LEAGUE ANNUAL EFFICIENCY TROPHY AWARD 2002

CPO Martin Ditton (TS AUGUSTA) accepts the NLA SA Annual Efficiency Shield from CMDR Alan Preskett, RFD, RANR (Rtd) President of the South Australian Division of the Navy league of Australia.