CONTENTS
MARITIME
AIR SUPPORT
Draft
papers by former Federal Vice President & Past President Victoria Division,
John Bird Life Member on Maritime Air - Endorsed by Victoria Division
Executive.
"It is now a decade since the Navy League of Australia seriously
pursued the acquisition of a fixed wing maritime air capability. Since
that time, the following two factors have determined that the League
desist in its efforts, even though the need has not disappeared during
the intervening period -
a.) The previous government's determination that the capability
should be dispensed with,
b.) Continued endeavours by the League could embarrass Navy without
achieving any tangible benefit.
The general view that the defence budget could not fund an organic air
capability for the fleet, has never been accepted by the League as a
reason for not recognising the need. It is a matter of priorities and
it has long been held by many, that a fleet without organic air support
is much less viable than a smaller fleet with that support; indeed the
former is not a complete entity. The time has come when it becomes necessary
to remind the present government of its undertaking when in office in
1982, to maintain a fixed wing maritime air capability. Discussion at
high level within Navy, has suggested that such an approach would no
longer be seen as an embarrassment to the Service; there are of course
some who think that such action would still he unproductive ('twas ever
thus). The views of others in the defence community would lead one to
believe that it would now be worthwhile revisiting the matter of the
acquisition of this vital addition to our defence armoury. The capability
referred to is still the STOVL aircraft with an appropriate carrying
vehicle aircraft which additionally can also be carried by other existing
fleet units. To those who hold that if and when the time comes, allies
will provide the appropriate facilities that we lack, it must be said
that whilst recognising the need to aim for collective defence of our
region, realistically it must be accepted that there are circumstances
in which we would not receive the support of allies and this of course
includes circumstances in which the United States under ANZUS, would
not be in a position to provide assistance. The need therefore is to
develop a maritime defence force that Is self sufficient to the extent
that is economically feasible and a STOVL capability is without doubt
the most economical manner in which we can acquire the fixed wing air
support that would achieve a degree of self sufficiency that may be
seen to be acceptable. The force requires to be able to respond to situations
which may develop in and around our island home and in our neighbourhood,
embracing at least New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, our island dependencies
and to a reasonable extent our sea lines of communications, the loss
of which could deny the nation the ability to resist an aggressor for
more that a very limited period of time. Economic constraints would
determine that a STOVL force would be minimal for the forseeable future,
but it would enable us to regain the expertise that we possessed before
1983 and provided sufficient crews were trained (be they dressed in
Navy blue or Air Force blue) we would be in a position to expand the
facility rapidly if and when the need arises. Current wisdom presumably
still dictates that fleet units will be provided with air support by
our FA18 squadrons, but since that would require in many circumstances,
using up to have of the aircraft likely to be serviceable at any given
time, the likelihood of such a commitment being given, at a time when
the squadrons may be needed for continental defence, is very questionable.
In such an event surface units could well be operating in circumstances
which would place them at considerable risk. As a side issue, the value
of STOVL aircraft in support of Army in the inhospitable north, when
operating in areas remote from even small airstrips would be enormous.
Development of the current STOVL aircraft has seen improvements to the
machines that were sought in the last decade and it is understood that
research is underway aimed at replacing the Harrier/AV8B presently in
service in other navies. It has also been reported that unmanned aircraft
are being researched that might perhaps fill the role of navy support.
If either of these proposals eventually produce equipment which provides
our requirements better that the present generation STOVL aircraft that
is fine, but let us not wait upon the results of this research before
again endeavouring to persuade government of the need for organic air
support for the elect; the details of the implementation will follow
as part of the inevitable feasibility study that will follow in due
course. As to the matter of funding, there is of course no simple solution
and serious thought must, as previously suggested, be given to the question
of priorities.
Some
avenues, which come to mind, are:-
1. Reduce the number of fleet units, which are currently in the
pipeline, or in future programs.
2. One defence analyst has suggested that it may be valid to
consider a trade off between organic air and future surface to surface
missiles.
3. An article in 'The Navy' suggested that when the time comes
to replace Kanimbla and Manoora, this could be done with an appropriate
'carrying vehicle'.
There
are no doubt other avenues which may be explored and equally doubtless
is the fact that some YAII say that we cannot afford to regain a capability
that was once seen as an essential part of this nation's defence armoury.
It is suggested that the time is ripe to persuade governments that
we cannot afford not to plug this serious gap in our defence capability
by acquiring a facility, without which we will possess a fleet unable
to carry out its intended functions without placing the ships and their
crews at unacceptable peril.
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